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Some have argued that the only credible communicator about mental illness is someone who has 
experienced mental illness. In the present study, I examined whether previous experience of 
mental (versus physical) illness is perceived as expertise when communicating about the 
challenges faced by those with mental illness but as bias when arguing on behalf of the group 
(e.g., against stigma towards those with mental illness). The study (N = 87) utilized a within-
subjects (2 x 2) design and asked participants to read eight source descriptions. Each description 
featured a recent college graduate or current college student with a diagnosis of mental or 
physical illness. Each source was said to advocate or describe a mental-illness-related issue, such 
as advocating for reduced stigma towards those with mental illness (i.e., advocacy) or 
communicating the challenges faced by those with mental illness (i.e., description). Participants 
rated each source on dimensions of bias, expertise, trustworthiness, likeability, and credibility. 
For both types of messages, a repeated measures general linear model showed that when the 
source has a background of mental illness, they are seen as more trustworthy (p < .01), expert (p 
< .001), likeable (p approaching .05), and credible (p < .01), but also as more biased (p < .001). 
When examining the effects of experience on perceptions of source credibility, I found that 
perceptions of expertise consistently mediated between experience of mental versus physical 
illness and perceptions of source credibility (for both types of messages -- advocacy: indirect 
effect B = 0.52, CI [0.29, 0.82], description: indirect effect B = 0.65, CI [0.24, 1.10]). For the 
messages describing challenges faced with mental illness, perceptions of trustworthiness 
(indirect effect B = 0.2, CI [0.02, 0.43]) and likeability (indirect effect B = 0.14, CI [0.02, 0.30]) 
also mediated effects of experience on perceptions of source credibility alongside perceptions of 
expertise. For both messages, a person with mental illness experience is perceived not only as 
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more expert, likeable, and trustworthy, but also as more biased. However, for the messages 
examined, their credibility seems to be determined more by these alternative perceptions and not 
by perceived bias. These results raise a potential issue as to whether there is some type of context 





















Communicating About Mental Illness: Perceptions of Sources with and Without Mental 
Illness 
Communicating about mental illness is crucial, but who should serve as the 
communicator? Some have argued that the only credible communicator about mental illness is 
someone who has experienced mental illness. That idea makes sense if a key part of the 
communication involves claiming knowledge of what people face when they deal with mental 
illness. In such cases, experience with mental illness could lead to a source being perceived as 
more expert, or knowledgeable about what it is like to deal with mental illness. However, there 
could also be a downside to mental illness experience on the part of a source. That is, because the 
person might be seen as arguing on behalf of a group to which s/he belongs, the person could be 
viewed as biased to favor the group (and perhaps view the issues in a way that unduly supports 
the group).  
Previous research has directly induced perceptions of expertise and bias to examine their 
effects.  For example, recent research by Wallace, Wegener, and Petty (2020) has shown that if a 
source is perceived as more biased (controlling the levels of expertise to be relatively high), the 
message will be processed more negatively. Those effects of source bias are also separable from 
those of source untrustworthiness (i.e., perceived dishonesty of the source). Such effects of 
source bias might represent a more general dependence of bias effects on the perceived level of 
expertise the source possesses. For example, Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) found that “the effect 
of bias will be greater for sources of greater expertise” (p. 70). Similar to Wallace et al. (2020), 
Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) also found that a message from an unbiased source of high 
expertise will have greater influence than a biased source with the same level of expertise. 
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Birnbaum and Stegner did not assess the perceived credibility (overall quality) of the source, but 
traditional persuasion theory would connect overall impact of the source to such perceptions.   
Much past work has examined influences of perceived source credibility. For instance, 
Cooper, Blackman, and Keller (2016) noted that expertise and trustworthiness are considered to 
be the pillars of credibility (see also Petty & Wegener, 1998). In this context, it is also interesting 
to note that Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) did not address perceptions of untrustworthiness that 
might covary with perceptions of source bias. Additionally, Wallace et al. (2020) also showed 
that biased sources lead to less favorable reactions to a persuasive message presented by that 
source. 
Little research has examined how perceptions of bias are formed or what types of 
information can lead to perceptions of bias (let alone forming a basis for both perceptions of bias 
and expertise). One exception is some research in an unpublished Master’s Thesis from the same 
lab where I developed my thesis. Specifically, Wallace (2015) found that sources who use weak 
arguments are viewed as both less expert and as more biased. The Wallace (2015) effects were 
general effects (regardless of the type of message presented), but in the current work, I examined 
whether certain types of messages might push people toward being especially likely to view 
experience as relevant to the source’s bias versus the source’s expertise. 
What about the effect of experience in regard to expertise and bias? This specific 
question has not been addressed in the previous literature. Relevant knowledge could be 
indicative of expertise but also of bias if the source is using their knowledge to advocate for 
something that would benefit their group. Research from Wallace et al. (2020) indicates that 
“…descriptions relevant to a person’s motivation to take a particular position primarily affected 
perceptions of bias” (p. 30). These results make sense and may be attributed to perceptions of the 
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source having a possible vested interest. Vested interest is commonly thought of as the source 
having a personal stake or something to gain by successfully persuading the message recipient. 
Vested interest has been shown to cause the source to be viewed as more biased and as less 
trustworthy (Wallace, 2019).  
The current research examines whether a source’s experience can be taken by message 
recipients as reflecting expertise or reflecting bias. Experience might indicate unique knowledge 
that can make the source seem like an expert on the topic or it could lead the message recipient 
to perceive a vested interest on the part of the source and, therefore, bias. In the present research, 
I examined two different types of messages that might emphasize one perception of experience 
or the other. Merely talking about experiences might encourage perceivers to treat the experience 
of the source as reflecting expertise. On the other hand, advocating on behalf of the group might 
encourage perceivers to treat the experience of the source as information about group 
membership and, therefore, vested interest in the outcome of advocacy, leading to perceived 
bias. Thus, I tested whether previous experience of mental (vs. physical) illness is perceived as 
expertise when communicating about the challenges faced by those with mental illness but as 
bias when arguing on behalf of the group (e.g., against stigma towards those with mental illness).  
A source with a history of mental illness should have general knowledge concerning 
mental illness treatment, policy, and accessibility. Therefore, one might often perceive a history 
of mental illness as indicative of expertise on many topics aimed at providing information about 
the experience of mental illness. Such perceptions could enhance that person’s credibility in 
presenting informational messages. However, when taking a position perceived as potentially 
benefiting people with a history of mental illness, that very history could also lead the source to 
be perceived as biased. Such perceptions could undermine that person’s credibility in presenting 
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such advocacy messages. I hypothesize that experience with mental illness will be viewed as 
expertise when the source is describing the challenges of dealing with mental illness but as bias 
when the source is advocating for something related to mental illness. Wallace et al. (2020) 
found that a source can be perceived as biased without also being perceived as dislikeable, 
untrustworthy, or inexpert, though features such as the quality of arguments provided in the 
message have also influenced such broader perceptions of the source (see Wallace, 2015). 
Therefore, in addition to examining perceptions of bias and expertise, I also examined potential 
influences of source experience on perceptions of source likeability and trustworthiness.  
Methods 
Participants.  
This study utilized eighty-seven undergraduates enrolled in an Introduction to 
Psychology course at the Ohio State University (OSU). Participants were recruited through the 
Research Experience Pool at OSU. 
Design and Procedure.  
This study used a within-subjects design consisting of four conditions: a 2 (Type of 
Message) x 2 (Illness Experience) design. After consenting to participate in the study, 
participants read eight source descriptions – two each in the four conditions: advocacy/mental 
illness experience, advocacy/physical illness experience, describing challenges/mental illness 
experience, and describing challenges/physical illness experience. Each stimulus described a 
recent college graduate or current university student with a previous diagnosis of a mental or 
physical illness. Descriptions also included an issue portion that said whether the graduate was 
advocating for something related to mental illness or describing the challenges faced by those 
with mental illness. An example of a source description for someone in the describing challenges 
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and mental illness conditions is, “Issue: Describing the challenges faced by people with a history 
of mental illness. About the person: Recent college graduate (B.A. in Psychology) who was 
diagnosed with clinical depression their junior year.” An example of a source description for 
someone in the advocacy and physical illness condition is, “Issue: Advocating for reduced 
stigma against people with a history of mental illness. About the person: Current university 
senior (4th year student about to receive Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology and 
Neuroscience) who was diagnosed with gout (a joint inflammation condition) during their 
sophomore year.” After reading each issue/source description, participants rated the source on 
measures of bias, expertise, trustworthiness, and likeability (counterbalanced), on credibility, and 
on vested interest (as a manipulation check on the type of message relating to the interest of 
sources with experience of mental vs. physical illness). After participants read about and rated all 
eight sources, they answered questions to assess their level of contact with those diagnosed with 
mental illness and possible levels of prejudice towards those with mental illness.   
Independent variables  
Illness Experience. Participants were exposed to four mental illness descriptions and 
four physical illness descriptions. Mental illness diagnoses were comprised of depression and 
anxiety. Physical illness diagnoses consisted of rheumatoid arthritis and gout. 
Message Type. Participants were exposed to four advocacy messages and four describing 
challenges messages. Advocacy messages consisted of advocating for reduced stigma against 
those with mental illness and advocating for greater mandatory insurance coverage for mental 
illness treatment. Messages in the describing challenges condition entailed describing challenges 
faced by those with a history of mental illness and describing what it is like to be in treatment for 
mental illness.  
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Dependent measure 
Perceptions of credibility. Perceptions of credibility were measured with five questions 
used by Wallace et al. (2020). As an example, one of the items was, “To what extent do you 
view this person as a high-quality source of information on this topic?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very 
much). 
Mediator variables 
Perceptions of bias. Perceptions of bias were measured with four questions used by 
Wallace et al. (2020). As an example, one of the items was, “How objective do you think this 
person is on this topic?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). 
Perceptions of expertise. Perceptions of expertise were measured with four questions 
used by Wallace et al. (2020). As an example, one of the items was, “To what degree do you find 
this person to be qualified to discuss this issue?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). 
Perceptions of trustworthiness. Perceptions of trustworthiness were measured with two 
questions used by Wallace et al. (2020). As an example, one of the items was, “How honest do 
you think this person would be on this topic?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). 
Perceptions of likeability. Perceptions of likeability were measured with two questions 
used by Wallace (2019). As an example, one of the items was, “How likeable do you find this 
person to be?” (1 = not at all likeable, 9 = very likeable).  
Manipulation check 
Perceptions of vested interest. Perceptions of vested interest were measured with two 
questions. As an example, one of the items was, “To what extent would the person potentially 
benefit from an effective message on this topic?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much).  
Results 
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Manipulation Check.  
Perceptions of vested interest served as our manipulation check. Vested interest was 
analyzed using a repeated measures general linear model using Illness Experience, Message 
Type, and their interaction as predictors. The analysis showed that sources with prior mental 
illness experience were viewed as having more vested interest (M = 7.53, SD = 1.6) than sources 
with prior physical illness experience (M = 5.54, SD = 1.43), F (1, 83) = 97. 86, p < .001. In 
terms of the message type main effect, the describing challenges condition was unexpectedly 
associated with higher perceptions of vested interest (M = 6.71, SD = 1.45) than the advocacy 
condition (M = 6.39, SD = 1.11), F (1, 83) = 6.79, p = .01. Perceived vested interest was also 
impacted by an interaction of Illness Experience and Message Type, F (1, 83) = 57.72, p < .001. 
That is, when presenting an advocacy message, sources with prior mental illness experience were 
viewed as having more vested interest (M = 7.09, SD = 1.47) than sources with prior physical 
illness experience (M = 5.73, SD = 1.39). When describing challenges, sources with prior mental 
illness experience were still viewed as having more vested interest (M = 8.07, SD = 1.95) than 
sources with prior physical illness experience (M = 5.35, SD = 1.74), but to a greater extent than 
when presenting an advocacy message. That pattern was not expected, and it might make it more 
difficult to find unique effects of experience on perceived bias across the two messages. 
Comparison of mean source perceptions. 
  All source perceptions were analyzed using a repeated measures general linear model 
using Illness Experience, Message Type, and their interaction as predictors. When examining 
perceptions of bias, the analysis showed that sources with mental illness experience were 
perceived as having more bias (M = 6.07, SD = 1.12) than sources with physical illness 
experience (M = 4.97, SD = 1.33),  F (1, 84) = 41.85, p < .001. In terms of the Message Type 
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effect, sources presenting an advocacy message consistently showed higher perceptions of bias 
(M = 5.56, SD = 0.95) than sources presenting a description message (M = 5.47, SD = 1.07), but 
not significantly, F (1, 84) = 2.18, p =.14. The interaction of Illness Experience and Message 
Type was not significant, F (1, 84) = 0.63, p = .43. 
 When examining perceptions of expertise, the analysis showed that sources with mental 
illness experience were consistently perceived as more expert (M = 6.57, SD = 1.31) than 
sources with physical illness experience (M = 5.62, SD = 1.34), F( 1, 84) = 41.74, p < .001. 
Message type did not produce a significant main effect, F (1, 84) = 0.33, p = .49, but perceived 
expertise was impacted by an interaction of Message Type and Illness Experience, F (1, 84) = 
8.03, p = .01. That is, when presented with an advocacy message, sources with mental illness 
experience were seen as more expert (M = 6.5, SD = 1.36) than sources with physical illness 
experience (M = 5.77, SD = 1.45). When describing challenges, sources with mental illness 
experience were again seen as more expert (M = 6.67, SD = 1.37) than sources with physical 
illness experience (M = 5.48, SD = 1.56), and to a larger degree than when presenting an 
advocacy message.  
When examining perceptions of trustworthiness, the analysis showed that sources with 
prior mental illness experience were viewed as more trustworthy (M = 6.59, SD = 1.24) than 
sources with prior physical illness experience (M = 6.09, SD = 1.27), F (1, 85) = 17.69, p < .001. 
Message Type did not produce a significant main effect, F (1, 85) = 0.31, p = .58, but perceived 
trustworthiness was impacted by an interaction of Illness Experience and Message Type, F (1, 
85) = 8.64, p < .01. When presented with an advocacy message, sources with previous 
experience of mental illness were seen as more trustworthy (M = 6.5, SD = 1.28) than sources 
with physical illness experience (M = 6.24, SD = 1.33). When describing challenges, sources 
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with a background of mental illness were also seen as more trustworthy (M = 6.69, SD = 1.38) 
than sources with physical illness experience (M = 5.94, SD = 1.54), and to a greater extent than 
when presenting an advocacy message. 
 When examining perceived likeability, sources with a mental illness background were 
seen as more likeable (M = 6.21, SD = 1.33) than sources with a background of physical illness 
(M = 5.99, SD = 1.23), F (1, 84) = 5.6, p = .02. There was not a main effect of Message Type, F 
(1, 84) = .96, p = .33, or an interaction of Message Type and Illness Experience, F (1, 84) = 2.99, 
p = .09.  
 When examining perceived credibility, sources with a background of mental illness were 
seen as more credible (M = 6.47, SD = 1.35) compared to sources with a background of physical 
illness (M = 5.79, SD = 1.44), F (1, 84) = 20.53, p < .001. There was no significant main effect 
of Message Type, F (1, 84) = .56, p = .46, but credibility was impacted by an interaction of 
Message Type and Illness Experience, F (1, 84) = 9.45, p < .01. That is, when presenting an 
advocacy message, sources with a background of mental illness are seen as more credible (M = 
6.4, SD = 1.35) than sources with a background of physical illness (M = 5.94, SD = 1.42). When 
presenting a description message, sources with mental illness experience are seen as more 
credible (M = 6.54, SD = 1.43) than a source with physical illness experience (M = 5.67, SD = 
1.69), but to a greater extent than when presenting an advocacy message. 
Mediation analyses.  
Mediation analyses were analyzed using the MEMORE macro for SPSS which utilizes 
5,000 bootstrapped samples (Montoya, A.K., 2019). The macro uses the data as a population, 
samples participants randomly with replacement to create samples of size equal to the collected 
data, and produces bootstrapped estimates of the within-subject indirect effects. The MEMORE 
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macro does not conduct moderated mediation analyses, so I conducted a separate within-subject 
analysis of source experience effects within each type of message.  
When examining the potential mediators of effects of source experience on perceptions of 
source credibility, I found that perceptions of expertise consistently mediated between 
experience of mental versus physical illness and perceptions of source credibility (for both types 
of messages -- advocacy: indirect effect B = 0.52, CI [0.29, 0.82], description: indirect effect B = 
0.65, CI [0.24, 1.10]). For the advocacy messages, perceptions of likeability (indirect effect B = 
0.03, CI [-0.21, 0.10])), bias (indirect effect B = -0.01, CI [-0.13, 0.10]), and trustworthiness 
(indirect effect B = 0.02, CI [-0.05, 0.11]) were found to be non-significant. For the messages  
describing challenges faced with mental illness, perceptions of source trustworthiness (indirect 
effect B = 0.20, CI [0.02, 0.43]) and likeability (indirect effect B = 0.14, CI [0.02, 0.30]) also 
mediated effects of experience on perceptions of source credibility alongside perceptions of 
expertise. Perceptions of source bias (indirect effect B = -0.01, CI [-0.17, 0.18]) were found to be 
non-significant (for figures presenting path coefficients for each of the source perceptions, see 










Figure 1.  







Note. p < .05*, p <.01**, p < .001*** 
 
Figure 2.  


































 My hypothesis that experience with mental illness will be viewed as expertise when the 
source is describing the challenges of dealing with mental illness but as bias when the source is 
advocating for something related to mental illness was only partially supported. The hypothesis 
implied that there might be Message Type X Illness Experience interactions for both perceived 
expertise and perceived bias, with larger effects of experience for description messages on 
expertise, but larger effects of experience for advocacy messages on bias. The interaction on 
perceived source expertise was as predicted – mental illness experience led to greater perceived 
expertise than physical illness experience, and that effect was stronger when the message 
described challenges encountered by people with mental illness than when it advocated on behalf 
of the group. However, perceived bias was influenced similarly by illness experience regardless 
of which message was involved. One likely reason for this is that perceptions of vested interest 
were actually more influenced by illness experience when the message involved describing 
rather than advocating. To find stronger influences of experience on perceived bias, it might be 
necessary to find a type of message for which vested interest is even less than for the current 
description messages. 
 The experimental effects showed that Illness Experience and an interaction of Illness 
Experience and Message Type were consistent influences on source perceptions. The interactions 
that appeared paralleled the predicted pattern for perceived expertise (i.e., with stronger effects 
of experience on source perceptions when the message was describing challenges rather than 
advocating). Within this overall pattern, there were many instances when a source with a 
background of mental illness is viewed as more trustworthy, expert, likeable, and credible, but 
also as more biased. Findings that a source can be viewed as biased but also as trustworthy, 
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likeable, and expert aligns in some ways with findings from Wallace et al. (2020). Yet, whereas 
perceptions of source bias and source trustworthiness are typically negatively correlated, many 
of the current effects of experience increase both perceived bias and perceived trustworthiness. 
That positive relation across conditions is a new pattern in this literature.  
For the messages I examined, credibility seems to be determined most consistently by 
perceptions of expertise, and sometimes by perceived trustworthiness, and likeability, but not by 
perceived bias. The impact of perceived expertise is not a surprise. Though the experience 
variable was not expected to influence perceptions of trustworthiness, its impact on perceptions 
of source credibility also parallel previous results (e.g., Wallace et al., 2020). Likeability is 
interesting in that it was not traditionally assumed to be part of the credibility construct. Yet, 
recent analyses suggest that perceptions of credibility and of likeability are, in fact, related 
(Wallace, Simon, & Wegener, under review). The previous research does suggest that there are 
contexts in which perceived bias undermines perceptions of source credibility (Wallace et al., 
2020). However, most of those previous data involve relatively counter-attitudinal messages. 
Perhaps the current positions described in the study stimuli were too pro-attitudinal for message 
recipients to view the biased person as lacking credibility. It would be interesting for future 
studies to more closely examine when perceived bias does or does not influence credibility. It 
will also be interesting to consider whether there are ways to influence whether a message 
recipient emphasizes the expertise versus the bias perceptions that stem from a given experience 
(like past experience with mental illness). 
 Although this study obtained some significant findings, there are still limitations. Some 
limitations of this study are that I used a convenience sample and did not ask about 
demographics (so I do not know the gender breakdown of the sample). This makes it difficult to 
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know whether a similar pattern would be likely in new studies examining different types of 
message recipients.  Future studies can improve upon these limitations by using a more diverse 
sample as well as including demographics questions.  
Despite these limitations, the findings of this study are meaningful for numerous reasons. 
First, by discerning whether experience with mental illness is viewed as expertise or as bias, we 
can use this knowledge to enhance our understanding of when sources with a history of mental 
illness are likely to be persuasive. Furthermore, distinguishing which messages are associated 
with perceptions of credibility of a source with a history of mental illness can increase the 
effectiveness of these messages. Lastly, discriminating how to best utilize a source with a history 
of mental illness can reach members of the population that may feel alienated by government or 
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